The tradition of political analysis committed to individual liberty, constitutional government and limited state power — but, unlike the classical liberalism it descends from, acutely aware of the dangers and complexities of mass democratic society.
Its distinctive move is sociological. Tocqueville's Democracy in America (1835-40) argued that the threat to liberty in a democratic age would come less from the state than from the tyranny of majority opinion, and that liberty survives only where intermediate associations, local self-government and inherited habit sustain it. Mill's On Liberty (1859) made the parallel case against social rather than legal coercion, and his harm principle remains the most-cited formulation of the limits of legitimate interference. What both added to liberalism was the recognition that freedom is shaped by social conditions, not merely protected by legal ones.
The twentieth century extended the tradition in two directions that sit uneasily together. Isaiah Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty warned that the language of self-realization could license coercion in freedom's name, and his value pluralism denied that liberal goods can be ranked without loss. Rawls moved the other way, arguing that a genuinely free society must also satisfy demanding distributive conditions. The gap between them is the central fault line of modern liberal thought: whether liberalism is primarily a doctrine of restraint or a doctrine of justice.
The tradition is now under pressure from several directions at once — communitarian critics who deny that the unencumbered liberal self exists as described, populists who reject its institutional constraints, and internal critics who argue that its neutrality about the good life is neither achievable nor honest. Its defenders generally answer that no rival tradition has produced better protections for the dissenting minority, which is the test liberalism asks to be judged by.
