Neoconservatives believe American military power and global leadership are forces for good that should be actively used to promote democracy, defend human rights, and maintain world order. Against both isolationism and realist restraint, they argue that American security and prosperity depend on actively shaping the international environment—and that spreading freedom serves both moral and strategic purposes.
The movement originated among former liberals and leftists who moved rightward in the 1960s-70s, disillusioned with counterculture, détente, and what they saw as Democratic weakness on defense. Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, and other intellectuals built institutions and publications that shaped Republican foreign policy, culminating in influence during the George W. Bush administration and the Iraq War.
The core neoconservative insight is that democracies don't go to war with each other—so spreading democracy spreads peace. Combined with belief in American exceptionalism and military supremacy, this produces an activist foreign policy: support for Israel, opposition to authoritarian regimes, willingness to use force for regime change, and skepticism of diplomacy with adversaries.
Neoconservatism faced severe backlash after Iraq—the costs, casualties, and chaos discredited the project in many eyes. The rise of Trump-era nationalism explicitly rejected neoconservative foreign policy. Yet the movement persists in think tanks, publications, and among foreign policy professionals who maintain that American retreat creates dangerous vacuums.
At roughly 1.5% of the population, Neoconservatives are a small elite strain concentrated in foreign policy institutions, defense industry, and political commentary. Their influence exceeds their numbers through institutional positions and relationships. Critics see them as warmongers who learned nothing from Iraq; supporters see them as clear-eyed about threats in a dangerous world.